A class of two-person nonzero sum games where the strategy choices are constrained in some form for each player is analyzed here to show the equivalent nonlinear programs which must be solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium solution is shown in appropriate cases to lead to complementary eigenvalue problems, which hare applications in normal solutions of stochastic LP models and optimal design problems in linear regression theory.
INTRODUCTION
For a two-person nonzero sum game it is known [S, 151 that a Nash equilibrium point, if it exists, can be equivalently characterized by the optimal solution of a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints. The object here is to show that for a certain class of constrained games, where the strategies are in some sense restricted, the Nash equilibrium solution leads to an equivalent pair of complementary eigenvalue problems. In applied work [l, 31 two types of constraints on the strategy vectors have been discussed. For instance, in chance-constrained games [l] strategies are assumed partially controllable i.e. actual strategy used (2) by player 1 is a linear combination of a preassigned strategy (x0) and a chosen strategy (x) so that 3 = ws + (I -W) x0 where the scalar weight w is fixed; likewise for player II j = 17' + (I -r) 3pO , where r is a fixed scalar weight. The interpretation of the preassigned vectors x0 , yO is that they variously involve risk, uncertainty or competition. ,4 second interpretation, due to Isaacs [4] argues that x0 , ~7~ are the initial probability estimates in terms of the respective subjective probability distributions of the two players. The decision problem before each is how much to perturb his initial probability estimate to obtain his maximum expected payoff such that it is consistent with the optimal strategies played by the other player.
In the present development the second interpretation is used in the following sense: the n-dimensional strategy x of player I is assumed drawn from a subjective probability distribution with mean lvO and variance-covariance matrix U and likewise, the m-dimensional strategy vector y of player II is drawn from a distribution with mean yO and variance-covariance matrix I;'. Assuming U, V symmetric and positive definite we introduce the multivariate distance [9] measure D'(.) as follows Lqx, x0; U) = (x -x0)' U-1(x -x0) (1.1)
('4
Let r-l and B be the payoff matrices to players I and II respectively. The two constrained games, one for each player is then defined by p"'Bqo = m*z{pO'Bq 1 q' V-lq = 1) (1.6) the interpretation of the constraints of (1.3) and (1.4) is that the chosen strategies x, y must be close to Y 0 , y. respectively in terms of the distance measures (I. 1) and (1.2).
Analogous to (1.3), (I .4), we consider two other related constrained games as follows: where there are no initial probability estimates x,, , y,, preassigned. In this game the strategy vectors x, y are not normalized so that 2Yxi , ZyJ need not add up to unity. However, if an optimal pair (x, y) of solutions exist for (1.7), (1.8), then there must exist a normalized pair (9, 3) where (1.9)
In the next game, the objectives of (1.7), (1.8) are considered more generally and the modified strategy vectors p, q are subject to preassigned distances i.e., Player I: subject to m;x P'dP, 4) P'P < k, In this game, the payoff function for each player may be interpreted as profits which depend partly on the strategy chosen by the other player. This is the framework of Cournot's duopolistic market model [14, 161, . H ence a Cournot-Nash equilibrium point for the modified game (1. lo), (1.11) may be defined by a pair of strategies (p", @), where the objectives of ( 1.10) and (1. I 1) are simultaneously fulfilled i.e., p"k(pO, q") = m;x(p'g(p, q") I p'p < k; k > 01 (1.12)
q"'h(p", 4") = mp{@h(p", 9) 1 p'Q < r; r > 01 (1. 13) where the functions g(p, q), h(p, Q) are defined before in (1.10). (1.1 I). The aim of this work is to state the quadratic programming problems that have to be solved in case of these constrained games to obtain a Nash equilibrium point and to show that for this class of nonzero sum constrained games there exist an equivalent pair of complementary eigenvalue problems in appropriate cases. Section two derives some theoretical results, followed by a section on potential applications in economics, statistical estimation and stochastic linear programming [5. 11, 121.
EQUIVALENT EIGENVALUE PROBLEMS
The three constrained games above are each assumed to have Nash equilibrium points [8] which are defined by (1.5), (1.6), or by (1.12), (1.13) and the modified strategy vectors p, 4 of players I and II are assumed to have finite dimensions 11 and nz respectively, satisfying the usual normalizing conditions i.e., L'x, := Zy, = 1, I 3 0, y 2 0. Then the following results can be stated and proved:
THEOREM 1 (Equivalence Theorem).
If the i\!ash epu&ktlm point (p", Q') exists for the game (I . 
where X and TV are scalar multipliers associated with the constraints of (1.3) and (1.4) respectively. The values of 2X and 2~ at the maximum, 2X' and 2u" equal the expected payofs to players I and II respectively. Further, the optimal pair (p", q") must satisf-v the complementary eigenvalue problems in 6' = 4+
zchere the value of 0 at the maximum, 8O = (2h0) (2~~) must be taken. subject to p'l?'p < 1; q'1'-lq < 1
where the values of A, TV at the maximum ho, p" are nonnegative and (2.5)
-#so, if the ;Vash equilibrium pair (~0, qo) e.vist such that the associated scalars X0, ~0 are positive, then there must exist at least one B which is the common eigenvalue of AI'B'U and B'UA b' such that it is positive and the associated eigenvectors are nonnegative.
Proof. Interpreting
A, p as multipliers associated with the constraints of (1.3) and (1.4) respectively, the conditions (2.2) are necessary for any Nash equilibrium point (p", 4") defined by (1.5) and (1.6) if it exists. Hence, by assumption the set S of (p, q, A, CL) satisfying (2.2) cannot be empty. Further, for any (p, q, A, p) E S we must have ~'(4 + B) q -h -/I < p"'( A + B) q" -ho -po since (~0, no) is an optimal pair with the associated optimal values X0, p" for the multipliers. Further, from (2.1) and (2.2) we obtain: pO'(A + B) q" -A -p < A0 + p" P9 hence Further, since f = p'(A + B) q -h -p is a continuous function for all t E S where t = (p, 4, A, CL), there exists a nonempty neighborhood N(tO) around to = (p", q", ho, PO) for which (2.8) holds. Let J be the set obtained from the intersection of two sets S and N(t"). Then for all t, to E J we have lnJcp'(llr + B) q -A -p == pO'(A + B) qo -A0 -/Lo = x0 $ I*".
(2.9)
Conversely, let to satisfy (2.9). Th en since the set J is nonempty, there exists at least one t E J such that $(A + B) q -X -p = ho + p". Hence for to to be a maximum in J one must have
Using this with (2.2) one gets p"'Aqo -2h0 = 0, p"'Bqo -2p" = 0. Hence to E J satisfies the maximizing conditions for the Nash equilibrium defined by (1.5) and (1.6).
Furthermore, on combining the relations of (2.2) at the equilibrium pair (p", q") we obtain the generalized eigenvalue problems (2.3). In case C, I' are homoscedastic, these become ordinary eigenvalue problems (2.4) in the eigenvalue 80 = 4A"po.
By following a similar argument, Corollary 1.2 can be proved, where the maximum eigenvalue 80 and the associated eigenvectors which are nonnegative exist, because the matrices A VB' U, B' UA V are by assumption nonnegative and the Perron- which reduces to 2X, 2p" respectively, if or=p=Qandk=l =r.Further,ifit holds that the equilibrium point (PO, q") satisJes the first two constraints of (3.1) as an equality, then the equilibrium must satisfy a pair of complementary eigenvalue problems where 0 = Up. COROLLARY 2.2. If there were no nonnegativity constraints p -3 0, q > 0 such that the jirst two constraints of (3. I) hold as equality at (p", q") and the following Hessian matrix H (3.8)
is negative semi-dejnite, then the necessary conditions (3. I) are also s@cient.for the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The conditions (3.1) are necessary for the Cournot-Nash euilibrium defined by (I. 12), (1.13) and this follows from the Kuhn-Tucker theorem [6, 121 . Combining the third and fourth equations of (3.1) along with h(k -p'p) = 0 = p(r -q'q) leads to the equivalent nonlinear program (3.2), (3.3). The line of proof used in Theorem 1 may then be used to characterize the equilibrium point (p", q", X0, PO) and the expected payoff to the two players given by (3.4) . If the first two inequalities of (3.1) hold as equality, then the pair of eigenvalue problems (3.5) or (3.6) or (3.7) follow. Furthermore, if the Hessian matrix H defined in (3.8) is negative semi-definite for fixed position scalars iy, fl then the objective function (3.2) is concave; hence by Kuhn-Tucker theorem the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Q.E.D.
Similarly with respect to the constrained game (I .7), (1.8) we may state the following. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATION
The above formulation of constrained games as equivalent nonlinear programs has implications for application in several areas, two of which may be mentioned in particular.
First, it may be applied to normal solutions of a stochastic linear programming (LP) model where there is parameter uncertainty.
The concept of a normal solution of a stochastic LP problem has been recently introduced by Tikhonov [17] by means of the supplementary condition that the optimal solution sought must be closest in some sense to a preassigned point. This game is interactive in the sense that each player observes the other player's pattern of play and incorporates his subjective estimates of the mean and variance of the other player's strategy in his conditional payoff function; also there is the mutual rationality assumption through c = E, w = x which implies that in the long run the subjective estimates are fulfilled. If this latter assumption does not hold, one may have to introduce partially controllable strategies in terms of the distance p = c -E, 4 = x -5.
It is clear from (5.5) that if an optimal solution vector (co, x") exists for the quadratic program (5.5) such that where p" = x0 -i; and X0 is the optimal value of the multiplier associated with the constraint of (6.5). It is clear that if vector /3 in (6.1) is controlled by nature, just as x is by the experimenter and an analogous interpretation is put on p, then we can set up an optimum choice problem for player II, the decision maker as: minimize (/3 -f)' P&3 -p) subject to (6.7) (#I -p)' I$'(/3 -f) = r, r>O where y, VB are the mean and variance of the random vector p and their estimates are ?, p,j , whereas Vz denotes the variance based on observations 9. Again, the optimal vector (/3O -7) must satisfy-the eigenvalue problem in A0
(b-2 -X"F;l)*o = 0
where Q" = /3" -9 and A0 is the optimal value of the multiplier associated with the constraint of (6.7). For long run equilibrium and compatibility of subjective estimates by the two players one may have to impose additional conditions like fl = /3.9?, .C = x in which case the pair of eigenvalue problems (6.6) and (6.8) become complementary.
Some other applications arising in nonconvex quadratic programs and bilinear differential game models have been treated elsewhere [ 1 I, 12, 141.
